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International relations in pre-colonial East Asia 
followed a distinctively hierarchical order. With its 
unparalleled economic, political and military 
strengths, China stood at the center of the regional 
hierarchy (Faribank, 1968; Mancall, 1984; Kang 
2010). The rest of East Asia was incorporated into the 
regional order through an elaborated institutional 
framework?the tribute system (Faribank, 1942; Man-
call, 1968). Under this system, foreign countries were 
invited to pay tribute to China. By submitting to the 
supremacy of China, foreign rulers were rewarded 
with the official recognition by the imperial court, 
lucrative tributary trade with China, and, on some 
occasions, imperial protection in the case of emer-
gency (Shu, 2012). The tributary states were even 
ranked by China according to their cultural conformity 
to the Chinese civilization and their loyalty to the 
imperial court (Kang, 2010: 57-59). It is often consid-
ered that the hegemony of China, together with the 
hierarchical tribute system, had contributed to the 
long-term peace and stability in East Asia prior to the 
arrival of European powers in the mid-19th century 
(see Kang 2007, 2010).
Southeast Asia had long been an integral part of 
the China-centered tribute system (Reid, 1996; Stuart-
Fox, 2003; Wang, 1998a, 1998b; Wolters, 2008). In 
the eastern mainland, Dai Viet had been a ‘loyal’ trib-
utary state ever since it got independence from China 
in the 10th century. Its southern neighbor and long-
term competitor, Champa, similarly sought a close 
tributary connection for both economic and political 
reasons. In the central mainland, the pre-historical 
Kingdom of Funan sent tributary missions to China as 
early as in the 3rd century (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 30). 
Later, the Khmer empire and different Tai and Laotian 
Kingdoms also pursued active tributary relations with 
the Middle Kingdom. Only in the more distant western 
mainland, the Burmese kingdoms of Pagan, Toungoo 
and Konbaung dispatched sporadic missions. In mari-
time Southeast Asia, the trading states of Srivijaya, 
Brunei, Luzon, Sulu and Melaka all sought close trib-
utary connections with China until the region fell 
under the European powers in the 16th century. The 
powerful Javenese Empire of Majapahit, though wary 
of its vassals’ contact with China, regularly dispatched 
its own envoys to the Ming court.
For many pre-colonial Southeast Asian countries, 
tributary trade with China not only brought a steady 
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Under the tribute system Southeast Asia had long been dominated by China in the pre-colonial era. This arti-
cle examines the hegemonic influences that China had exerted on pre-colonial Southeast Asia. Based on the 
literature of hegemonic stability, China’s influences are analyzed according to four theoretical perspectives: norm 
socialization, public-good provision, hegemonic coercion, and institution-building. Firstly, China’s self-perceived 
cultural state had not socialized the ‘Indianized’ states of Southeast Asia. Secondly, despite the vibrant commer-
cial links that China-centered tributary trade had created, it was not an economic order open to all Southeast Asian 
countries. Thirdly, the coercive campaigns that China waged in mainland Southeast Asia had altered the sub-
regional power balance beyond its control. Fourthly, the pre-colonial tribute system was sophisticated and long-
lasting, but its institutional impacts had not escaped the dynastic cycle of China’s imperial power. These findings 
not only challenge the view that the China-dominated regional hierarchy had been stable and peaceful, but also 
raise questions about the applicability of hegemonic stability in a non-Western pre-colonial context.
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inflow of wealth but also created a solid foundation to 
thrive on the Asian trade routes (Reid, 1993). During 
the periods when China was strong and its foreign 
policy outward-looking, the power balance in South-
east Asia was also more easily maintained (Wolters, 
2008: 69). However, Southeast Asian countries were 
far from peaceful and stable under the tribute system. 
Fierce competition for survival and domination had 
characterized the balance-of-power politics throughout 
the pre-colonial era (Shu, 2012). The inter-state con-
flicts between Dai Viet and Champa, between 
Ayutthaya/Siam and Burma, and among the kingdoms 
of Sumatra and Java all lasted for several centuries 
without a clear winner. These conflicts were further 
complicated by the distinctive political structure in 
pre-colonial Southeast Asia?the Mandalas, where 
loosely-controlled vassals frequently led to conflicting 
political claims and overlapping jurisdictions (Wolters, 
1999; Stuart-Fox, 2003). Different from the experi-
ences of the Confucian world in Northeast Asia (Kang, 
2010), the hegemony of China had not produced a 
decisive impact on the sub-regional stability of pre-
colonial Southeast Asia.
Why did the undisputed hegemony of China fail 
to create long-term peace and stability among its tribu-
tary states in pre-colonial Southeast Asia? According 
to the hegemonic stability theory, a predominant hege-
mon should be conducive to an open trade order and 
stable inter-state relationship (Kindleberger, 1973; 
Krasner, 1976; Gilpin, 1981). To achieve a stable 
order, the powerful hegemon can employ at least four 
different strategies, each representing a specific school 
of modern international relations theories (see Milner, 
1998). The hegemon may project its power and coerce 
subordinate states to comply; it may provide important 
public goods and motivate other states to follow suit; 
it may establish multilateral institutions to maintain a 
desirable inter-state order; it may even create a set of 
values and norms to socialize its subordinates. Yet, 
hegemonic stability is a contemporary international 
relations concept of Western origin?. To what extent it 
is applicable to pre-colonial Southeast Asia remains an 
open question. Aware of this possible caveat, the arti-
cle intends to conduct a theory-guided historical 
analysis to achieve two objectives: firstly, to under-
stand China’s hegemonic presence in pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia based on the claims of hegemonic sta-
bility; secondly, to conduct a history-informed 
reassessment of the hegemonic stability theory in a 
non-Western context.
The rest of the article is organized in the follow-
ing way. The next section discusses the intellectual 
development of hegemonic stability theory, exploring 
different theoretical interpretations as well as their 
critics. The intention is to show that hegemonic stabil-
ity is an evolving theoretical framework capable of 
communicating with novel evidence. Then, the hege-
monic impacts of China on pre-colonial Southeast 
Asia are examined from four perspectives. The third 
section assesses the socialization effect of China’s 
self-perceived cultural state in Southeast Asia. The 
fourth section explores the link between public goods 
provision and tributary trade in pre-colonial Southeast 
Asia. The fifth section examines the coercive dimen-
sion of hegemonic China, focusing on the imperial 
China’s military campaigns in mainland Southeast 
Asia. The sixth section discusses the changing institu-
tional strength of the China-centered tribute system. 
The article is concluded with a summary of the main 
findings and a discussion about their implications for 
the hegemonic stability theory.
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The theory of ‘hegemonic stability’, a term coined 
by one of its critics (Keohane, 1980), is first articu-
lated around the mid-1970s. At a glance, the theory is 
simple and straightforward. It posits that a single, 
dominant power (i.e., the hegemon) is conducive to 
stability and prosperity in the world. The theory is 
normally attributed to three scholars: Charles Kindle-
berger, Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner. While all 
of them accept the logic of hegemonic stability, the 
meaning of stability differs in their accounts. Accord-
ing to Kindelberger (1973), the experiences of the 
Great Depression show that only a predominant power 
is able to create a stable world economy. A stable eco-
nomic order requires a steady flow of capital, adequate 
liquidity, stable exchange rate, and coordinated mone-
tary policies, something Lake (1984) refers to as the 
‘international economic infrastructure’. For Gilplin 
(1975, 1981), stability has both political and economic 
connotations. In political terms, stability is ‘an inter-
national system of relative peace and security’ (Gilpin, 
1981: 145). In economic terms, stability is a liberal 
economic order featuring ‘free trade, foreign invest-
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ment and a well-functioning international monetary 
system’ (145). In Krasner’s (1976) account, stability is 
simply considered as an open trading structure. It 
should be noted that the contemporary understandings 
of liberal economic stability, especially concerning 
capital liquidity and financial coordination, were well 
beyond the reach of the pre-colonial era. In this article, 
stability is defined as open trade order and stable 
inter-state relationship in order to make a realistic 
assessment of China’s hegemonic impacts on pre-
colonial Southeast Asia.
Behind the theory of hegemonic stability, there is 
always a question about the intention of the hegemon. 
Is the predominant power a benevolent or a coercive 
architect of the world order? The answer to this ques-
tion matters because a coercive hegemon not only 
aggressively imposes its will on the subordinates but 
is more likely to punish the disobedient followers. By 
contrast, a benevolent hegemon acts like an enlight-
ened leader who guides the rest of the world through 
crisis and leads them towards prosperity. As Snidal 
(1985) points out, the original theory of hegemonic 
stability fails to specify the hegemonic intentions. 
Nonetheless, Alt et al.’s (1988) game-theoretical 
model shows that there is no qualitative difference 
between benevolent and coercive hegemon. A benevo-
lent hegemon offers selective incentives to reshape the 
behavior of subordinate states; a coercive hegemon 
resorts to political or military sanctions to enforce its 
will. Both approaches are costly to the hegemon. So, 
whether a hegemon is benevolent or coercive depends 
on the relative ‘efficiency’ of benevolence or coercion 
(see Lake, 1993). If necessary, a benevolent hegemon 
can easily resort to coercion.
Logically, the theory of hegemonic stability is 
based on the model of public goods provision?. Stable 
economic and political order is a genuine public good. 
Every state enjoys the benefits of a stable world but 
few are willing to bear the cost of it. Because of this, 
stability is usually in short supply in international 
political economy. According to Mancur Olson (1965), 
apart for the rare situation of well-coordinated collec-
tive action, only a ‘privileged group’ has the incentive 
and capability to supply public goods because public 
goods disproportionally benefit the privileged one. 
The hegemon is a predominant power in world poli-
tics. Analytically, it can be regarded as a privileged 
group since the hegemon has a very high stake in the 
stable world order. For this reason, the hegemon 
should be willing to provide and maintain stability in a 
world where it dominates. This is the essential logic 
behind the hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin, 1981; 
Gowa, 1989; Lake, 1993)?.
However, the metaphor of public goods is ques-
tioned by some. As Conybeare (1984) points out, it is 
more plausible to conceptualize the international trade 
relations as a game of prisoners’ dilemma than the 
game of public goods provision. In the prisoners’ 
dilemma game, self-interested players lead to a non-
cooperative suboptimal outcome?. There is no reason 
to believe that the hegemon is not self-interested. 
Instead of promoting free trade, the hegemon may 
well use an optimal tariff to improve its terms of trade. 
Moreover, free trade is excludable and therefore not a 
public good. The hegemon can selectively offer free 
trade to a sub-group of subordinate states rather than 
create a global free-trade order. While Conybeare’s 
criticism focuses only on trade, it has important impli-
cations for the theory of hegemonic stability. It 
indicates that the existence of a hegemon may not 
automatically lead to an open trade order.
In a careful response to these critiques, Gowa 
(1989) argues that the real hegemon is not myopic. 
Just like a monopolist company sets price below the 
short-term maximum, the hegemon may not want to 
use optimal tariff to exploit its predominant status for 
short-term benefits. In the long run, free trade brings 
more benefits to the hegemon. Gowa (1989) also con-
tends that while free trade is not a public good, the 
enforcement of non-universal trade rules is. Since the 
third countries can ship their products to a free trade 
state for further (duty-free) export, the enforcement of 
non-universal free trade arrangement engenders very 
high monitoring cost. So, the hegemon should prefer a 
global free trade order to limited free trade deals. 
Nonetheless, it is debatable as to what extent a hege-
mon is far-sighted enough to pursue a free trade world, 
the enforcement of which can also be very costly.
Even if one accepts the metaphor of public goods, 
it is still possible to question the theory of hegemonic 
stability on other grounds. In particular, the provision 
of public goods does not always require a ‘privileged 
group’ such as the hegemon. A small group of coordi-
nated actors can also supply public goods and induce 
collective action (Olson, 1965). As Lake (1984) and 
Snidal (1985) show, a small group of states may at 
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least resume the responsibility of ‘hegemonic coopera-
tion’ after the decline of the hegemony. That is, the 
world may remain stable even without the presence of 
a hegemon. Keohane (1984) takes this argument a step 
further, and claims that international cooperation 
among a small group of countries under a well-defined 
international regime is plausible even ‘after hege-
mony’. This theoretical advancement not only explains 
the puzzles of ‘hegemonic lag’ that the world wit-
nessed in the early 1980s as the economic power of 
the US declined vis-à-vis Japan and West Germany, 
but also points to the crucial roles of international 
regimes in creating and maintaining a stable world 
order. Nevertheless, the institutional turn has not 
refuted the plausibility of hegemonic stability. It 
shows that the hegemon should have a strategic inter-
est in establishing an effective international regime to 
keep its preferred world order (Keohane, 1997: 161).
Considering the profound influences of ‘cultural 
hegemony’ on postwar intellectuals (see Gramsci, 
1971)?, it is surprising that the early writers of hege-
monic stability have little to say about the ideologies 
and values that a hegemon may exploit to maintain its 
(stable) order. Only briefly does Gilpin (1981: 34) 
note that ‘the position of the dominant power may be 
supported by ideological, religious, or other values 
common to a set of states.’ Ten years later Ikenberry 
and Kupchan’s (1990) article on ‘Socialization and 
Hegemonic Power’ manages to bring scholarly atten-
tion to the constructivist aspect of hegemonic power. 
As their study points out, a hegemon can exercise sub-
stantial power and establish preferred international 
order by socializing the ‘substantive beliefs’ of other 
countries. In the international system dominated by a 
hegemon, the socialization process often takes place 
after major wars and political crises or in wake of the 
hegemonic use of coercive power. To achieve hege-
monic socialization, it is more essential to alter the 
beliefs of elites than to change public opinion. These 
arguments further enrich the literature on hegemonic 
stability. They show that a stable world order is no less 
plausible under hegemonic socialization. An effective 
socialization strategy is not only compatible with but 
also in need of the benevolent use of material incen-
tives and the coercive means of political sanctions.
The advancement of hegemonic stability theory 
in the past four decades has greatly enhanced our 
understandings of the international order dominated 
by a hegemon. Overall, the theoretical debates point to 
four hegemonic strategies that are conducive to a sta-
ble politico-economic order. Firstly, the hegemonic 
state can use the socialization strategy by creating a 
set of norms and values to socialize the substantive 
beliefs of subordinate states. Secondly, the hegemon 
may employ the public-good provision strategy by 
maintaining an open trade order to the benefit of all 
states. Thirdly, the dominant state can resort to the 
coercive strategy to force subordinate states to follow 
its hegemonic wills and comply with its preferred 
international order. Fourthly, the hegemon may pursue 
the institution-building strategy by establishing a sta-
ble international regime to regulate international 
politico-economic relations beyond the rise and fall of 
its power. Derived from the theoretical debates, these 
hegemonic strategies are not the de facto foreign poli-
cies of a hegemon, but they together provide a useful 
benchmark to examine the hegemonic influences of a 
predominant state.
However, it should be noted that two historical 
periods?the British Empire in the 19th century and the 
United States after the Second World War?dispropor-
tionally inform the early thinkers of hegemonic 
stability (Kindleberger, 1973; Krasner, 1976; Gilpin, 
1981). Today, Pax Britannica and Pax Americana 
remain the key words one finds in the literature. 
Though it might be an exaggeration to call it ‘ethno-
centrism’ (see Grunberg, 1990), it is hard to deny the 
Western origin, if not bias, of hegemonic stability. 
This raises an important question on whether the the-
ory is similarly applicable in a non-Western pre-
colonial context?. Without assuming the universal 
validity of hegemonic stability, this article intends to 
assess some of its analytical assumptions through a 
theory-guided historical analysis of pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia.
In summary, hegemonic stability offers a sophis-
ticated theoretical framework to understand the 
hegemonic impacts of a predominate state. The social-
ization strategy, the public-goods provision strategy, 
the coercion strategy, and the institution-building strat-
egy each provide a useful perspective to decode the 
hegemon’s special roles. Admittedly, hegemonic sta-
bility is an evolving theoretical framework of a 
distinctive Western origin. Its intellectual development 
in the past decades shows that active communication 
with constructive critiques and novel evidence has 
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contributed to the advancement of hegemonic stability 
theory. Adopting a similar attitude, the following sec-
tions apply the four hegemonic strategies to explore 
the special impacts of China on pre-colonial Southeast 
Asia.
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Imperial China’s foreign policy towards South-
east Asia was deeply rooted in the Chinese views of 
the world and its special position within it (Fairbank, 
1968; Mancall, 1984). As a number of studies point 
out, Chinese emperors called themselves the ‘Son of 
Heaven’, and indeed considered themselves as the 
essential link between heaven, the human world and 
the earth (Fairbank and Teng, 1941; Mancall, 1968; 
Wang, 1998a; Stuart-Fox, 2003). It, then, follows logi-
cally that being the mediator between heaven and 
earth allowed China to rule not only its own territory 
but also the other human societies standing between 
heaven and earth. Such unconcealed cultural egocen-
trism, characterizing many early human civilizations, 
is perhaps not a sign of Chinese exceptionalism. What 
made China special are the restrictive moral require-
ments of traditional Chinese cosmology. As Wang 
(2000: 168) notes, during the first enduring empire of 
the Han dynasty the Chinese views of the world 
underwent a dramatic transformation from ‘a cosmol-
ogy of the conquering... that justified violence into a 
moralized cosmology of Heaven’; correspondingly, 
the understandings of the emperorship also changed 
from ‘a conquering political power to a vehicle for... 
ethical ideals’. Similarly according to the Confucian 
thoughts, real power does not come from the abrupt 
use of force. It is instead derived from the rule of vir-
tue and the moral authority of the ruler. Internally, rule 
of virtue requires an orderly social hierarchy and a 
compassionate government; externally, rule of virtue 
brings barbarians to acknowledge voluntarily the cen-
trality of China (Fairbank, 1942; Wang, 1968; Stuart-
Fox, 2003: Ch2). Furthermore, both the social 
hierarchy and the Chinese centrality should be per-
formed and celebrated through elaborated rituals. 
These cultural understandings formed the essential 
norms and values behind the China’s self-perceived 
hegemonic power.
Although the moral connotations of Chinese cos-
mology and Confucian thoughts were not always 
reflected in the actual conduct of China’s foreign rela-
tions, the rhetorical reality of China’s moral authority 
was of considerable importance to pre-colonial South-
east Asia. One of such moral requirements was the 
principle of inclusiveness. When Zheng He was sent 
by the Ming court to Southeast Asia in the early 15th 
century, he was instructed to persuade all countries to 
submit to China’s dominance. Foreign countries, 
regardless of big or small, should be equally wel-
comed and treated with respect. This was also the 
message that the Ming envoy sent to Brunei in 1370. 
Despite that Brunei was then a vassal of the powerful 
Javanese Empire of Majapahit, the country was invited 
with the assurance of equal treatment and full protec-
tion. That is, Brunei and Java would be treated as 
equal before the Ming court (Wang, 1968: 51). In 
addition, China appeared to adopt the principle of non-
exploitation in its dealing with Southeast Asia. The 
inferior status of tributary states was neither an eco-
nomic burden nor a straightforward political 
obligation. For one thing, ‘the value of the tribute 
objects was certainly balanced, if not out-weighed, by 
the imperial gifts’ to demonstrate China’s ‘magnanim-
ity and benevolence’ (Fairbank, 1942: 135; Stuart-
Fox, 2003: 33). For another, China had ‘never [made] 
any attempt to be precise about what tributary status 
meant’ politically (Wang, 1968: 57). The long-term 
vagueness indicates that China had rarely used the 
superior position to its own advantage. Tributary 
countries were sometimes requested to provide assis-
tance in the case of emergency. On other occasions, 
they were allowed to conduct their domestic and for-
eign affairs without China’s interference (Kang, 2010: 
55). Last but not least, China also followed the princi-
ple of impartiality ‘to protect the weak and deter the 
greedy’ in Southeast Asia (Reid, 1996: 22). The 
Ming’s invasion of Dai Viet in 1407 was claimed to 
fight against the usurpers and to restore the rightful 
ruler in the country. The Qing’s campaign against 
Burma in 1765-1770 was intended to protect the small 
chieftains from the exploitation of the powerful Kon-
baung king. When Dai Viet and the Laotian kingdom 
of Lang Xang were in conflict in 1479, China refused 
to intervene militarily. Instead, the Ming court sent 
envoys to both countries to instruct them how to keep 
good relations and protect their peoples (Stuart-Fox, 
2003: 92).
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Indeed, deep inside China’s self-perceived 
supremacy was the belief that foreign countries sub-
mitted to its hegemony not for China’s economic, 
political or military might, but because of their respect 
for China’s culture and civilization. However, whether 
such a Sino-centric view was shared by the countries 
in pre-colonial Southeast Asia is questionable. Most 
Southeast Asian countries have been culturally influ-
enced more by India than by China. Except in Dai Viet 
where the long-term Chinese rule produced a different 
set of social and cultural norms, Confucianism was of 
little significance to the ‘Indianized’ Southeast Asian 
states (Wolters, 1999; Stuart-Fox, 2003). As Coedes 
(1968: 15) points out in his revered work The Indian-
ized States of Southeast Asia, these countries practiced 
‘the arts, customs, and religions of India’ and used 
‘Sanskrit as their sacred language’. More importantly, 
‘Indianized’ Southeast Asian states had adopted ‘an 
organized culture... founded upon the Indian concep-
tion of royalty’ (15, emphasis added). Locating outside 
the Sinicized circle of Confucian states, these coun-
tries had probably interpreted China’s self-claimed 
inclusiveness, impartiality, and non-exploitation in 
very different ways.
Among the many cultural ideas that early South-
east Asian kingdoms learned from India is belief that 
the ruler was the representative of the greatest god on 
earth (Coedes, 1968: Ch2). The aim of the ruler was to 
acquire as much power as possible, so that his/her 
kingdom could resemble the heavenly realm and the 
ruler could claim him/herself the god of it (Stuart-Fox, 
2003: 31). The religious belief in reincarnation in Hin-
duism and Buddhism also allowed early Southeast 
Asian rulers to accept the temporary nature of power. 
Thus, submitting to another powerful kingdom, say as 
a tributary vassal, was considered temporary (Stuart-
Fox, 2003: 32). These ‘Indianized’ understandings of 
the world were very different from the traditional Chi-
nese worldviews outlined above. Nowhere was such 
difference more evident than in the suzerainty-tribu-
tary relations. In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, inter-
state relations were similarly characterized by a 
tributary structure (Wolters, 1999). Different from the 
China-centered tribute system, tributary states in 
Southeast Asia were supposed to make substantive 
contribution to the wealth and power of their suzerain. 
The subordinate rulers were required to pay a speci-
fied amount of valuable local products as their tributes 
on a regular base, which then constituted the major 
income of the powerful lord. In return, subordinate 
states were promised effective protection against 
potential threats. Yet, the tributary status was nothing 
to be ashamed of because it only reflected the tempo-
rary balance of power. When the times change, a 
subordinate state could establish its own tributary net-
work and be a powerful lord capable of extracting 
wealth from other countries.
Given these contrasting understandings of tribu-
ta ry re la t ions , the China’s commitment to 
inclusiveness, impartiality and non-exploitation was at 
best misunderstood and at worst resisted in pre-colo-
nial Southeast Asia. Soon after the Ming envoy invited 
Brunei to the Chinese court in 1370, Java warned Bru-
nei not to pay tribute to China. The Javanese envoys 
were heard as saying, ‘[i]f you give your allegiance to 
China, you will be without us. When Sulu attacks 
again, you will have to seek help from China’ (cf. 
Wang, 1968: 51). The warning appeared to deter Bru-
nei from seeking closer connection with China. In the 
remaining 30 years of the 14th century, Brunei sent 
only one mission to China, but continued to pay 
annual tribute to Java (Wang, 1968: 51). Only after 
China promised upgraded protection did Brunei 
resume its tributary mission to the Ming court in 1408. 
On that occasion the Brunei king not only visited 
China in person but brought his family with him. 
Together they received a splendid reception. Declaring 
that Java should exempt Brunei from tribute, the Chi-
nese emperor wrote a personal poem and inscription to 
memorize the occasion (Reid, 1996: 23)?. Apparently, 
both sides were satisfied, though for different reasons. 
In the Chinese eyes, its moral commitment to inclu-
siveness and impartiality finally persuaded a foreign 
ruler to pay homage to the Middle Kingdom. For Bru-
nei, to win the protection of a regional hegemon 
against neighboring powers was probably more in line 
with its ‘Indianized’ logic of tributary relations. In 
another case, the son of a recently died ruler of Jambi, 
then a Sumatra tributary to Java, secretly sought 
China’s recognition of his status as the new king in 
1377. The Javanese envoy resided in the Ming court 
had probably learned this diplomatic exchange (Wolt-
ers, 1970: 62-63). The ‘betrayal’ of Jambi enraged the 
Javanese ruler. When the Ming envoys were sent to 
grant imperial recognition to the new Jambi ruler, they 
were rerouted to Java and killed there in 1378.
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In short, the pre-colonial hegemony of China had 
an important cultural dimension. At least in the eyes of 
Chinese themselves, it reflected the morality of the 
ruler and his/her rule of virtue that had attracted the 
submission of foreign countries. Nevertheless, the 
self-perceived cultural state of China was not shared 
by most Southeast Asian countries. Under the influ-
ences of a different cultural tradition, the tributary 
relations among the ‘Indianized’ Southeast Asian 
states were marked by aggressive domination and 
extraction of resources. Due to the lack of shared cul-
tural understandings and a common value system, 
China’s self-proclaimed commitment to inclusiveness, 
impartiality and non-exploitation was often misunder-
stood and, on some occasions, violently resisted. The 
socialization strategy of China’s cultural state, though 
influential among the Confucian states of Northeast 
Asia (Kang, 2010), had largely failed to produce 
desired impacts on pre-colonial Southeast Asia.
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?????????????????????????????????
The provision of public goods plays a central part 
in the theory of hegemonic stability. In particular, the 
hegemon is expected to keep a stable economic order 
to the benefit of other countries. Based on the experi-
ences of the UK in the 19th century and the US after 
World War II, the literature claims that the hegemon 
should pursue the goals of global trade liberalization 
and open trade order (see Krasner, 1976). However, 
defining the trade order in pre-colonial Southeast Asia 
is not so straightforward. Firstly, there was the long-
standing tributary framework that allowed Southeast 
Asian countries to conduct duty-free trade with China 
(Fairbank, 1942). Yet, tributary trade was limited by 
the number of tributary missions that a country was 
permitted to submit to the Chinese court. Secondly, 
unlimited private trade was officially allowed only in 
certain periods of imperial China, notably the South-
ern Song and late Qing dynasties (Shiba, 1983; Reid, 
1996; Heng, 2009). These periods were marked by the 
relative decline of China. Thus, allowing private trade 
can hardly be seen as a sign of China’s hegemonic 
strength. Thirdly, some third tributary countries, such 
as Ryukyu, also played a key part in the pre-colonial 
trade between China and Southeast Asia (Reid, 1993).
To make sense of this complex picture, it is nec-
essary to consider the security implications of trade in 
pre-colonial East Asia. Imperial China was generally 
an agriculture-based economy. Instead of promoting 
trade, self-sufficiency had long been considered as a 
virtue and an obligation. There is an important secu-
rity reason behind limiting trade in China. Because of 
its potential impact on the concentration of wealth, 
free trade could easily lead to the political claim of 
local interests. Such claims not only endangered the 
unity of the country but also threatened the authority 
of the imperial court. Therefore, it was in the interest 
of the central authority to regulate and control private 
trade. As Tilly (1992: 128) points out, imperial China, 
like its counterparts in Europe, faced the interplay of 
two socio-political dynamics: ‘the bottom-up building 
of regional hierarchies based on trade and manufactur-
ing, [and] the top-down imposition of political 
control.’ In Europe, the persistence of bottom-up hier-
archies led to long-term fragmentation after the fall of 
the Roman Empire. By contrast, imperial China man-
aged to impose a top-down political order at the 
expense of trade and local economic centers?. Indeed, 
private trade was mostly banned during the periods of 
dynastic consolidation such as the beginning of the 
Ming and Qing dynasties. Only when the imperial 
court became financially weakened was private trade 
officially encouraged in an attempt to boost royal 
income.
A similar trend also characterized pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia. Trade had played an essential part in 
the state revenues of Southeast Asian trading coun-
tries. Particularly during the period of the ‘age of 
commerce’ (i.e., 1450-1680)?, revenues from trade 
constituted a substantial part of royal income in both 
maritime and mainland Southeast Asia (Reid, 1993: 
217). Because of its significance, international trade in 
valuable goods was typically monopolized by the rul-
ers. In Burma the royal court controlled the trade of 
amber, gems, gold, and iron; in Siam the loyal ware-
house was the only place where foreigners could buy 
tin, lead, sappanwood, and saltpeter (Reid, 1993: 248). 
Even with regard to the trade of less important goods, 
‘[s]trong kings almost invariably squeezed the mer-
chants and drove many of them away’ (Reid, 1993: 
247). Rather than encouraging private trade, Southeast 
Asian countries had similarly pursued the strategy of 
state dominance in pre-colonial international trade.
Under these circumstances, the China-centered 
tributary trade suited both sides quite well. Tributary 
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trade allowed foreign countries to conduct trade with 
China either at the border city where the tributary mis-
sions first arrived, or in the market set up next to the 
Official Residence for Tributary Envoys in the Chi-
nese capital (see Fairbank, 1942). Any commercial 
activities outside these designated markets were 
strictly forbidden, but tributary trade was free of duty. 
For China, tributary trade not just minimized the nega-
tive implications of unregulated private trade, but also 
provided a mechanism to show China’s benevolence 
and strength. For Southeast Asian countries, tributary 
trade with China ensured that international trade was 
conducted under the proper control of the royal court. 
Hence, tributary trade did create some sort of open 
trade order beneficial to China and Southeast Asian 
trading states. This open trade order even generated 
some noticeable stabilization impact on maritime 
Southeast Asia. As Wolters (2008: 69) notes, ‘peace in 
the southern ocean (i.e., maritime Southeast Asia) was 
restored at the time when there was a new Chinese 
dynasty, deliberately recovering the traditional fron-
tiers of China and, by means of special envoys, 
announcing its accession overseas in order to revive 
China’s foreign trade.’
However, tributary trade had never been an eco-
nomic order open to all. Only officially recognized 
tributary countries were allowed to conduct trade with 
China. In addition, there was specific limit regarding 
the number of tributary missions (and therefore trade) 
permitted in a certain period of time. In the Qing 
dynasty, for example, Dai Viet was permitted one trib-
ute in every two years, whereas Siam was allowed one 
in three years, Sulu one in five years, Burma and the 
Laos only one in ten years respectively (Fairbank and 
Teng, 1941: 175-176). Because of these restrictive 
rules, tributary trade actually created a group of ‘privi-
leged trading states’ in pre-colonial Southeast Asia. In 
the mainland, Champa and Cochin-China in southern 
Vietnam, Ayutthaya and Siam in southern Thailand 
had maintained close tributary relations with China for 
several centuries. All benefited substantially from the 
steady inflow of trade revenues (Reid, 1996; Lieber-
man, 2003; Wade, 2009). In the archipelago, the close 
tributary connection with China helped Sirvijaya and 
Melaka become the center of maritime Southeast 
Asian trade (Wolters, 1967, 1970; Lieberman, 2009). 
The status of Melaka was so prominent in the 15th cen-
tury that all other Southeast Asian countries sent their 
products first to Melaka for further export to China. 
Meanwhile, the eastern maritime trade route via Tai-
wan and Luzon (i.e., northern Philippines) was 
abandoned in the late 1420s (Reid, 1996: 34). For the 
countries which had few or no tributary links, they 
were forced to rely on third tributary countries, 
Ryukyu being the most well-known, to keep their 
trade flow with China (Reid, 1996: 30; Lieberman, 
2009: 799)?.
Because of the extensive influences of tributary 
trade, its decline and the subsequent rise of private 
trade often brought change and instability to Southeast 
Asia. When the Song dynasty allowed private trade in 
the 10th century, there was no immediate impact on the 
maritime empire of Sirvijaya. Nonetheless, Sirvijaya’s 
hold on the trading ports along the Malacca Strait 
loosened as these ports began to pursue their own 
trade with China. Step by step, ‘Song trade expansion 
stoked local resistance to Sirvijaya’s commercial 
claims’ (Lieberman, 2009: 793). The once powerful 
maritime empire ceased to exist in the 13th century. 
After nearly two hundred years of vibrant tributary 
trade, the ban on private trade was again lifted in 1567 
under the Ming dynasty. Immediately the abandoned 
eastern trade route was reopened. Port cities such as 
Manila, Hoi An, Patani and Batavia prospered as a 
result. Within a few decades the Portuguese who had 
occupied Melaka since 1511 were driven out of the 
pepper trade from western Java and southern Sumatra 
(Reid, 1996: 38-39). Unlimited private trade was also 
allowed in the Qing dynasty between 1684 and 1717 
and from 1727 onwards. During these periods foreign 
merchants retreated from Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Siam. One of the reasons was that the newly opened 
commercial access to Guangzhou made it no longer 
necessary to buy Chinese goods through Southeast 
Asian ports (Reid, 1996: 44). As private trade domi-
nated the Southeast Asian trade routes, most maritime 
Southeast Asian countries came to be recognized as 
‘trading countries’ rather than ‘tributary states’ by the 
Qing court in the early 19th century (Fairbank and 
Teng, 1941: 202-203).
On the whole, it is difficult to deny that China 
had attempted to build an open trade order in pre-
colonial Southeast Asia. For several centuries, China-
centered tributary trade brought Southeast Asian 
trading states into a regional economic network cover-
ing almost the whole East Asia. In the periods when 
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China was strong, vibrant tributary trade not just 
attracted a large number of Southeast Asian trading 
states, but also brought wealth and prosperity to the 
region. It is thus tempting to conclude that imperial 
China had provided the much-needed public goods?
an open trade order?in pre-colonial Southeast Asia. 
However, the open trade order stipulated in the hege-
monic stability theory refers to an economic order 
based on unlimited private trade rather than regulated 
tributary trade. In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, tribu-
tary trade was never an economic order really open to 
all. Instead of benefiting every country in the region, it 
created a group of privileged trading states with spe-
cial access to the Chinese market. Yet, as the ban on 
private trade was lifted at a time when Chinese hege-
mony was in decline, unlimited private trade was 
unable to restore regional order and stability.
These empirical anomalies raise doubt about the 
applicability of hegemonic stability in a non-Western 
context. Trade had special security implications in the 
pre-colonial era. In order to maintain the domestic 
political order, both Chinese and Southeast Asian rul-
ers preferred controlling rather than encouraging 
private trade. On the other hand, unlimited private 
trade often came to dominance when the region was 
marked by political changes and disorder. Apparently, 
the hegemon could not count on private trade to build 
a stable economic order in pre-colonial Southeast 
Asia. Though tributary trade was not a completely 
open trade order, it had created vibrant commercial 
links in pre-colonial Southeast Asia.
???? ??????????????????????
??????????????????????????????
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The coercive strategy is usually taken as granted 
in the hegemonic stability literature. It is assumed that 
the disparity of capacity allows the hegemon to effec-
tively enforce its wills on subordinate states. Instead 
of the actual coercive strategies, the literature pays 
more attention to the difference between coercive and 
benevolent hegemon (see Snidal, 1985; Alt et al., 
1987; Lake, 1993). The hegemonic influences of 
China on Southeast Asia had been more benevolent 
than coercive in the pre-colonial era. Although China 
had maintained unmatched military superiority vis-à-
vis Southeast Asia, there were very few conflicts 
between the two sides. For one thing, most Southeast 
Asian countries were China’s tributary states which 
paid regular homage to the imperial court (Wang, 
1968; Reid, 1996; Stuart-Fox, 2003). For another, the 
security threats to China had been located mainly on 
the northern borders of the country. The first Ming 
emperor even issued a long list of Southeast Asian 
countries that China should never attack (Wang, 
1998a: 311-312). Apart from the Mongol invasions in 
the 13th century?, China waged only three major cam-
paigns against Southeast Asia over a period of over 
one thousand years. These were the Ming occupation 
of Dai Viet between 1407 and 1427, the Qing cam-
paign against Burma between 1765 and 1770, and the 
Qing invasion of Dai Viet in 1788-1789?. Had China 
succeeded in enforcing its imperial wills on Southeast 
Asian countries through the use of physical coercion?
The two Chinese campaigns against Dai Viet 
were both intended to restore the ruler recognized by 
the imperial court. For China, Dai Viet was special 
because the country had been under direct Chinese 
rule till the 10th century (Taylor, 1983). When Dai Viet 
was recognized by the Song dynasty as an independent 
kingdom, its ruler was awarded the curious title of 
‘King of Jiao-Zhi Prefecture’, indicating a special con-
nection between the two countries (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 
45). Indeed, Dai Viet and China once shared similar 
bureaucratic structure, written language, and the Con-
fucian rhetoric. Because of such cultural intimacy, 
China had maintained close connection with Dai Viet 
throughout the pre-colonial era. A new Dai Viet ruler 
always sent his/her envoy first to China to seek impe-
rial recognition. China was also keen to play a role in 
the country’s loyal succession and dynastic change.
According to the Chinese official records, the 
Ming invasion of Dai Viet was a response to a series 
of unusual succession occurred in the country (Ming 
Shi Lu, 1968; see also Wang, 1998a). When the first 
Ming emperor sent his envoys to Dai Viet in 1369, the 
Tran dynasty just installed an adopted son of the loyal 
family as the ruler of the country. The succession was 
duly confirmed by the Ming court. However, the new 
ruler was thrown out by a usurper several months later. 
Nothing was reported to the Ming court. When China 
found out what had happened, it refused to recognize 
the usurper and declined his tribute. The official trib-
utes resumed two years later, but the relations between 
the two countries were not in a favorable condition. 
The emperor ordered the tributary rituals with Dai Viet 
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to be downgraded. When China’s official tallies were 
dispatched to Champa, Khmer and Ayutthaya (i.e., 
other tributaries in mainland Southeast Asia) in 1383, 
Dai Viet was not on the list (Wang, 1998: 310). Simi-
lar succession and communication problems occurred 
again during the reign of the third Ming emperor?. 
The emperor was first informed that a relative of the 
Tran family was installed as the new ruler in Dai Viet. 
Yet, it turned out that the recognized king was again a 
usurper and a regicide. The Ming court found the last 
remaining member of the Tran house and sent him 
back to Dai Viet. The person was murdered on his 
arrival (Wang, 1998: 315). Soon a full-scale invasion 
of Dai Viet was ordered in 1407, in the name of pun-
ishing the usurper and restoring the Tran dynasty.
One may reasonably doubt the real intentions of 
the Ming court. After all, the repeated overthrow was 
a sign of failed Tran ruling (Taylor, 1992: 149). More-
over, the Tran family already ceased to exist by the 
time of invasion. Still a large number of Ming troops 
were mobilized from ten Chinese provinces, and they 
were sent to Dai Viet by both land and sea. Initially 
the military campaign was a success. The usurper was 
overthrown and his troops were defeated. However, 
the decision to change Dai Viet into a province of 
China turned out to be a disaster (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 
82). The occupation drained the Ming treasury over 
the years, and the occupiers became exploitative and 
corrupted (Taylor, 1992: 150). Years of local resistance 
followed. At the end China was forced to withdraw in 
1427.
The Qing invasion of Dai Viet in 1788-1789 was 
another attempt to restore a recognized ruler. Offi-
cially, it was a response to the plea of the last king of 
the Le dynasty. Dai Viet had been thrown into turmoil 
due to the Tayson Rebellion since 1773. Historical 
records show that there were signs that the political 
turmoil of Dai Viet could spread into China (Wills, 
2001). When the rebel took the Le capital in 1787, the 
king was forced to take refuge in the nearby Chinese 
Province. There he asked for the assistance of the 
Qing court. A combination of internal concerns and 
external commitment probably led to the decision of 
invading Dai Viet. Within ten days of receiving the 
plea, the Qing court ordered the second full-scale 
invasion of Dai Viet in Chinese history. Troops were 
dispatched from the nearby provinces. Within a month 
the capital of Dai Viet was taken and the Le king was 
restored. However, Nguyen Hue, the youngest of the 
Tayson brothers, marched from the South. His forces 
launched an unexpected attack against the Qing troops 
in the lunar New Year holidays of 1789, and success-
fully forced them to retreat (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 114). 
After the Chinese withdrawal, Nguyen Hue immedi-
ately dispatched tributary mission to the Qing court 
for the official recognition of his new kingdom. To 
repair the bilateral relations, he even went to Beijing 
in person to celebrate the Qian-long emperor’s eighti-
eth birthday in 1790 (Reid, 1996: 48). It did not take 
long before Nguyen Hue was confirmed as the legiti-
mate King of Dai Viet.
Different from Dai Viet, successive Burmese 
kingdoms had kept distant connection with China. In 
the 13th century the ancient Burmese-Mon kingdom of 
Pagan was fatally defeated by the Mongols (Stuart-
Fox, 2003: 60-61). On its ruins the Toungoo dynasty 
and the ensuing Konbaung dynasty had established 
powerful kingdoms on the western Southeast Asian 
mainland. Nonetheless, China did not recognize these 
powerful rulers as kings during the Ming dynasty 
(Wang, 1998: 313). Similarly, the successive Burmese 
rulers showed little interest in establishing close tribu-
tary relations with China. Instead, they were busy 
battling with their regional rival Ayutthaya/Siam to the 
east, and dealing with small Shan states to the north 
(Lieberman, 2003).
The Konbaung dynasty of Burma was established 
in 1752. During its reign, Burma pursued an aggres-
sive state-building policy to bring the periphery 
vassals and tributaries under its direct control (Lieber-
man, 2003). At the time, there were a few independent 
chieftains located on the bordering areas between 
China and Burma, most of which paid tributes to both 
countries. As Konbaung tightened its controls, some 
chieftains turned to China for assistance. The response 
of the Qing court, initially only on a local scale, soon 
triggered a major military confrontation between the 
two countries (Dai, 2004: 155). Compared with the 
late invasion of Dai Viet, the Qing campaign against 
Burma lasted much longer. Between 1765 and 1770 
China sent four batches of forces to invade the coun-
try. At the beginning only the local troops were 
mobilized. As the battle dragged on, the emperor sent 
his elite Manchu troops to the Southwest border. In 
response, Konbaung was forced to withdraw its troops 
from Ayutthaya to fight against the Chinese. In the 
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end, it was the generals on the ground who decided to 
negotiate a truce to end the conflict in 1769. Back in 
the capitals neither the Konbaung court nor the Qing 
court was satisfied with the terms of the truce (Dai, 
2004: 168-170). It was not until 1790 that the tributary 
relations between the two countries were restored.
Although the three military campaigns all ended 
in China’s defeat, they generated some unexpected 
impacts on the power balance of mainland Southeast 
Asia. After the Ming troops withdrew from their 
twenty-year occupation in 1427, Dai Viet was embold-
ened to assert its sub-regional dominance in the 
eastern mainland. It invaded Champa to the south in 
1471, and marched into the Laotian Kingdom of Lang 
Xang to the west in 1479. On both occasions China 
was asked to provide assistance to contain the aggres-
sion of Dai Viet. However, the Ming court was not in 
a position to launch another attack against the country 
(Wang, 1998: 318). On the southern frontier Champa 
was fatally defeated and eventually became a vassal of 
Dai Viet. On the western frontier Lang Xang’s capital 
was taken and its king killed. Only after the Tai king-
dom of Lan Na offered military support did Lan Xang 
manage to drive Dai Viet troops out of its territory. By 
the end of 15th century a new sub-regional order 
emerged in the eastern Southeast Asian mainland, with 
Dai Viet standing at the top of it (see Li, 2010: 93).
The Qing campaign against Burma led to a con-
trasting outcome. In the same year as the Qing troops 
entered the Burmese border, the Konbaung dynasty of 
Burma launched its second attack against the Tai king-
dom of Ayutthaya. The Burmese troops attacked the 
country from both the north and the south. One year 
later they besieged its capital. Ayutthaya surrendered 
in the middle of 1767. Later that year, however, the 
Qing court dispatched the elite Manchu troops in its 
third campaign against Burma (Dai, 2004: 158-159). 
The Konbaung king was forced to withdraw his forces 
from their occupation of Ayutthaya to fight against 
China. Although Ayutthaya was left in a devastated 
situation after the Burmese withdrawal, a provincial 
governor, Taksin, managed to reclaim the country and 
declared himself the King of Siam in 1768. The new 
Tai kingdom successfully defended itself against 
another two Burmese attacks in the following twenty 
years. During the process, Siam unified the northern 
Tai Kingdom of Lan Na into its territory (Lieberman, 
2003). By the end of 18th century Siam had success-
fully established itself as a sub-regional power in 
central mainland Southeast Asia.
It would be naive to conclude that the coercive 
strategy pursued by China reshaped the power balance 
of mainland Southeast Asia in the 15th and 18th centu-
ries. On the contrary, China’s unsuccessful campaigns 
had accelerated the sub-regional power transition 
beyond its hegemonic control. To install the rightful 
rulers and to protect the independent chieftains were 
claimed to be the major reasons behind the use of 
physical coercion by the Ming and Qing courts. How-
ever, standing at a higher moral ground, itself being 
doubted by some, was not enough to compensate the 
ineffective implementation of coercive measures. 
Despite its superior military capacity, China had failed 
to pursue a coercive strategy to enforce the imperial 
wills on pre-colonial Southeast Asia. These failures 
further constrained China’s hegemonic influences on 
the power structure of mainland Southeast Asia in the 
following decades.
???? ??????????????????????????????????
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At the center of China’s hegemonic power had 
been the long-standing tribute system. The tribute sys-
tem was important because it offered an elaborated 
institutional framework to conduct China’s foreign 
relations in the pre-colonial era (Fairbank and Teng, 
1941: 141; see also Fairbank, 1942; Mancall, 1984). 
Receiving foreign envoys involved the tributary ritu-
als; royal communication with foreign countries 
employed the tributary rhetoric; international trade 
was mostly conducted under the tributary framework; 
and even restored diplomatic relations had to follow 
the tributary procedures. For China, the tribute system 
reflected the Confucian views of an orderly hierarchy 
between China and the rest of the world. For foreign 
countries, the tribute system provided a unique diplo-
matic channel to conduct de facto equal relations with 
China (Kang, 2010: 54). For a period of nearly two 
thousand years, the tribute system had been the insti-
tutional foundation of hegemonic China in East Asia 
(Fairbank, 1968).
Nevertheless, the tribute system is very different 
from the modern international regimes articulated in 
the hegemonic stability literature (Keohane, 1980, 
1984). First of all, the tribute system provided an insti-
tutional framework of China’s foreign services, 
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covering political, economic and diplomatic areas 
(Fairbank, 1942). It neither specialized in a specific 
policy issue nor regulated regional matters beyond 
China. Secondly, the tribute system was built on bilat-
eral inter-state relationship (Mancall, 1968: 65). There 
was probably a multilateral audience who paid special 
attention to the tributary relations between their neigh-
boring countries and China, but the official 
communication within the tribute system was always 
bilateral. Thirdly, the tribute system never offered an 
institutional framework to encourage international 
cooperation or regional governance. Given these 
noticeable differences, one may reasonably doubt 
whether the hegemonic stability theory can be fruit-
fully applied to the tribute system. However, it should 
be noted that the tribute system had facilitated the con-
verging expectations of tributary countries regarding 
the regional order preferred by China. The costly trib-
ute system also relied mostly on the voluntary 
contribution of the Chinese court. Without imposing 
the requirement of modern international regimes, it is 
still possible to examine the hegemonic impacts of the 
tribute system.
Institutionally, the tribute system was put into 
practice in the Han dynasty. Historical records show 
that the first tributary missions probably arrived in 
China around the 1st century BC (Li, 2004: 16). Even 
at that time, it was established that tributary rulers 
were awarded with the imperial appointment of a 
noble rank, and that the tributes were accepted in 
exchange for imperial gifts. Tributary trade was also 
an integral part of the tribute system. The first 
recorded tributary missions from Southeast Asia were 
sent by the ancient mainland kingdom of Funan. In 
total, Funan dispatched six missions to China in the 3rd 
century, then one in the 4th century, and another six-
teen in the 5th and 6th centuries (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 30). 
As China was internally divided during these periods, 
the tributes were probably delivered to the southern 
Chinese kingdoms at the time.
It was the unification of China under the Sui and 
Tang dynasties between the late 6th and the early 10th 
century that revitalized the tribute system. As far as 
Southeast Asia was concerned, tributary missions from 
the Gulf of Thailand and the Java Sea were regularly 
dispatched to the imperial court throughout the 7th and 
8th century (Wang, 1970: 375). Among them, the mari-
time Southeast Asian kingdom of Sirvijaya managed 
to establish very close tributary relations with China. 
Its missions continued well into the first half of the 
11th century when China was ruled by the Song 
dynasty (Wolters, 1970). Nevertheless, after the 
defeated Song reestablished itself as the Southern 
Song dynasty in 1127, the number of tributary mis-
sions dramatically declined. For one thing, China was 
no longer perceived as powerful as before. For 
another, private trade became such an important 
source of royal income that the imperial court became 
unwilling to accept duty-free tributary missions 
(Shiba, 1983). The traditional Chinese tribute system 
further deteriorated under the Mongol ruling. The 
Yuan dynasty imposed very harsh conditions on tribu-
tary countries, and forced them to pay tax and provide 
military covée on a regular base (Wang, 1968: 48). 
When these demands were rejected, armies were sent 
to Southeast Asia to enforce such policies.
The early decades of the Ming dynasty were 
probably the most glorious time of the tribute system. 
Partly because of the official ban on private trade and 
partly because of the grand expeditions of Zheng He, 
Southeast Asian tributes to China peaked in the early 
15th century (see Figure 1). The Mongol version of 
tribute was abandoned in favor of the traditional Chi-
nese tribute system. Foreign missions were received 
according to even more elaborated tributary rituals. 
Tributary trade was so important that some Southeast 
Asian states (e.g., Java) sent as many as three missions 
a year to China (Qiu, 1995: 128, 180). Nevertheless, 
after the Ming court moved the capital from Nanjing 
to Beijing in 1421 and the imperial treasury gradually 
weakened, China lost the interest in expanding its trib-
utary contact with Southeast Asia. In the decades after 
private trade was legalized in 1567, only Dai Viet and 
the Tai kingdom of Ayutthaya continued to dispatch 
tributary missions to China.
The last Chinese imperial dynasty of Qing inher-
ited many Ming practices of the tribute system, 
particularly in dealing with Southeast Asia. The insti-
tutional context was so similar and the Qing court 
explicitly requested the tributary countries to return 
the imperial seals granted to them during the Ming 
period (Fairbank and Teng, 1941: 164). A key differ-
ence was that the Qing dynasty no longer relied on 
tributary trade to promote its overseas influences. 
Except for an early ban on private trade, tributary 
trade was gradually replaced by private trade in the 
57
Hegemon and Instability: Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia under the Tribute System
late 17th and early 18th century. Still, Southeast Asian 
countries sent regular missions to the Qing court. 
Among the five designated tributary countries in 
Southeast Asia?, the number of missions was even 
noticeably increased between 1780 and 1840 (see Fig-
ure 2). However, with the Qing’s defeat in the Opium 
Wars and the European colonization of Malay, Burma 
and Vietnam, the tribute system ceased to be a hege-
monic magnet for Southeast Asia after the mid-19th 
century.
What factors had contributed to the rise and fall 
of the tribute system vis-à-vis pre-colonial Southeast 
Asia? Obviously, the hegemonic power of China was 
the most crucial factor in determining the influences 
of the tribute system. When China was strong and its 
foreign policy outward-looking, Southeast Asian coun-
tries were willing to pay tributes to its hegemonic 
influences. When China was weakened by internal 
division and external competition in the Southern 
Song, late Ming and late Qing dynasties, tributary 
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missions from Southeast Asia declined. Another factor 
had also been important: tributary trade. Private trade 
was banned in most time of imperial China. During 
these periods, tributary trade offered Southeast Asian 
trading states an attractive alternative to maintain their 
commercial links with the Chinese market. In the Han, 
Tang, and early Ming dynasties, tributary trade was 
probably the most important reason why so many 
Southeast Asian missions came to China.
Nevertheless, the explanations of hegemonic 
power and tributary trade stand uncomfortably with 
the sudden increase of tributary missions between 
1780 and 1840 (Figure 2). The Qing dynasty was in 
decline during this period. Tributary trade had also 
been replaced by private trade. Though Fairbank 
(1942) argues that commercial reasons explained this 
sudden increase?, there were other important political 
dynamics beneath the scene. One of these was the 
coercive measures that the Qing had taken against 
mainland Southeast Asia. Mentioned earlier, large-
scale military campaigns were launched against 
Burma (1765-1770) and Dai Viet (1788-1789). As the 
clear winner, Dai Viet increased the frequency of its 
tributary missions to China after 1789 in order to 
repair the bilateral relations. As the unexpected benefi-
ciary of China’s campaign against Burma, the newly 
founded Tai kingdom of Siam was eager to keep close 
relations with China after it was officially recognized 
by the Qing court in 1781. The Burmese missions also 
increased briefly after its relations with China were 
normalized in 1790. Even more notably, Burma again 
sent more missions to China in the 1820s and 1830s, 
probably requesting for China’s assistance when the 
country was fighting against Britain.
In summary, the tribute system had stood at the 
center of China’s hegemonic influences. Its profound 
impacts on pre-colonial Southeast Asia show that 
China had long pursued an institution-building strat-
egy to exert its hegemonic power. Except in the Yuan 
dynasty, the tributary system provided China with a 
non-aggressive institutional setting to maintain its 
superiority vis-à-vis Southeast Asian countries. Nota-
bly, both the public-good provision strategy of 
tributary trade and the coercive strategy of military 
campaigns had produced noticeable impacts on the 
tribute system. There was even a ‘hegemonic lag’ in 
the late Qing dynasty when Southeast Asian countries 
increased their tributary missions during a period of 
China’s decline.
However, the tribute system had never gone 
beyond an institutional framework of China’s foreign 
services. Although tributary trade partially contributed 
to a vibrant trade order in pre-colonial Southeast Asia, 
the tribute system as a whole had not achieved the 
long-term stability of the region’s international rela-
tions (Shu, 2012). Contrary to the theoretical 
prediction that international cooperation could be 
maintained ‘after hegemony’ (Kohane, 1984), the 
institutional impacts of the tribute system corre-
sponded roughly with the hegemonic strength of 
China. As the imperial power waned at the end of each 
dynasty, the tribute system lost its appeal to most 
Southeast Asian countries. The bilateral nature of the 
tributary relationship and the financial reliance on the 
imperial treasury were probably the main reasons 
behind this dynastic cycle. In retrospect, the long-
standing tribute system was sophisticated and 
influential, but it had not fulfilled the institution-build-
ing potentials of hegemonic China.
?????????????
Throughout the pre-colonial era China had a pro-
found impact on Southeast Asia. Under the tribute 
system, Southeast Asian countries came to China to 
pay homage for more than one thousand and five hun-
dred years. Economically, China had created a vibrant 
regional economic order centered on tributary trade. 
Its influences were so prominent that tributary trade 
once encompassed both Northeast and Southeast Asia. 
Politically, China had not only exerted substantial 
influences on the tributary states but also regulated 
inter-state relations far beyond its borders. Neverthe-
less, the hegemony of China was not enough to bring 
economic and political stability to pre-colonial South-
east Asia. The regional trade order was never 
completely open, nor did the inter-state relationships 
keep long-term stability among Southeast Asian coun-
tries.
This article has examined the largely failed hege-
monic strategies that China had pursued in pre-
colonial Southeast Asia. Firstly, the self-proclaimed 
commitment to inclusiveness, impartiality and non-
exploitation had not socialized the ‘Indianized’ states 
of Southeast Asia. Influenced by a different cultural 
tradition, pre-colonial Southeast Asian countries were 
more pragmatic in handling their relationship with 
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other states. In the end, China’s cultural state probably 
had a more attentive domestic audience than overseas 
influences. Secondly, because of the security implica-
tions of trade, both China and Southeast Asian 
countries had adopted a policy of state monopoly in 
pre-colonial international trade. As a result, the 
regional economic order under tributary trade had 
never been open to all. Instead, it created a group of 
privileged Southeast Asian trading states that kept 
close relations with China, and allowed them to domi-
nate the trade routes of Southeast Asia. Thirdly, the 
coercive campaigns that China had waged against pre-
colonial Southeast Asia ended all in failure. Instead of 
enforcing the imperial wills of regulating royal suc-
cession and protecting chieftains, these military 
expeditions had altered the power balance of mainland 
Southeast Asia beyond China’s control. Fourthly, the 
tribute system was long-standing and influential, but 
its rise and fall had not gone beyond the cycle of 
China’s dynastic changes. Despite being enthusiastic 
participants of the tribute system, most Southeast 
Asian countries were attracted more by China’s tem-
porary economic and political influences than by its 
hegemonic status in the regional order.
The fact that the undisputed regional hegemony 
of China had not brought long-term prosperity and sta-
bility to pre-colonial Southeast Asia has important 
implications in both empirical and theoretical terms. 
Empirically, the findings of the article question the 
scholarly optimism that pre-colonial East Asia under 
the dominance of China had been a peaceful and sta-
ble regional order (Kang, 2007, 2010). It is true that 
under the tribute system most Southeast Asian coun-
tries recognized the superiority of imperial China. 
Tributary trade also established a vibrant regional eco-
nomic order to the benefit of many Southeast Asian 
trading states. However, China’s unquestioned hege-
mony had neither led to a fully open trade order nor 
produced the long-term stability of inter-state relation-
ship. Throughout the pre-colonial era, the politico-
economic dynamics in Southeast Asia had been more 
or less self-contained, following its own logic of sur-
vival and competition (see Shu, 2012). Outside the 
Sinicized Confucian world, the hegemonic influences 
of imperial China should not be taken as granted.
Theoretically, the article raises some important 
questions about the hegemonic stability theory, and 
especially the claim that hegemony always leads to 
stability (Kindleberger, 1973; Krasner, 1967; Gilpin, 
1981). It is often assumed that the hegemon may resort 
to socialization efforts, public-good provision policies, 
coercive measures, and institution-building mecha-
nisms in order to maintain a stable international order. 
The experiences of pre-colonial Southeast Asia lend 
support to the theoretical critics that stability is not the 
automatic outcome of an existing predominant power 
(see Conybeare, 1984). Indeed, hegemonic stability 
appears contingent on a number of specific conditions. 
The socialization strategy is probably more effective 
within a common cultural background and shared 
value system; the public-good provision strategy must 
consider the politico-economic implications of public 
goods and follow the principles of inclusiveness in the 
international system; the coercive strategy requires 
consistent objectives and effective implementation to 
enforce the hegemonic wills; and the institutional-
building strategy should aim more at long-term 
international order than short-term hegemonic superi-
ority.
In addition to the conditional nature of hegemonic 
strategies, China’s failed hegemonic influences also 
cast doubt on the applicability of hegemonic stability 
in a non-Western context. Informed mainly by the his-
tory of the British Empire and the post-war US 
hegemony, the hegemonic stability literature may have 
overemphasized the importance of free trade in a sta-
ble international economic order (see Krasner, 1967; 
Gilpin, 1981; Lake, 1984). In pre-colonial East Asia, 
private trade was commonly treated as a source of 
political instability rather than an indication of eco-
nomic stability. Indeed, both China and Southeast 
Asian countries preferred regulated tributary trade to 
unlimited private trade in a stable regional economic 
order. By conducting a theory-guided historical analy-
sis, the article is able to identify the discrepancies 
between theoretical claims and empirical anomalies. 
Future research should follow this approach and 
encourage more communication between Western 
international relations theories and non-Western 
empirical realities (see Wohlforth et al., 2007).
????
??This is the second of two related articles that explore the 
pre-colonial relations between Southeast Asia and China. 
This article focuses on the China’s hegemonic impacts on 
pre-colonial Southeast Asia, and the other article (Shu, 2012) 
examines the strategic responses of Southeast Asia to the 
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China-dominated regional hierarchy. The author wishes to 
thank Paul Bacon and Haolan Zheng and two anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful suggestions and comments.
??The author wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing out this important issue.
??Public goods differ from private goods because their con-
sumption by one person does not prevent others from 
consuming it. Because of this, the supply of public goods is 
prone to the problem of free-rider.
??It should be noted that Krasner’s (1976) theory of hege-
monic stability does not employ public goods as the logical 
framework in his argument (see Lake, 1993).
??The literature on the prisoners’ dilemma is extensive and 
still growing. For an introduction to the game and its impact 
on cooperation, see Axelrod (1984).
??‘Cultural hegemony’ is a concept developed and 
expounded by Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). It refers to the 
dominance of a societal culture including its beliefs, norms 
and values. Gramsci argues that such dominance, though 
only reflecting the worldviews of the ruling class, leads to 
the perceived universal validity of its ideology and the wide 
acceptance of the status quo.
??On non-Western theories of international relations, see Bil-
gin (2008), Acharya and Buzan (2010).
??The Brunei king died several weeks after the grand recep-
tion. He was buried in Nanjing (then the capital of China) in 
1408, where his tomb is still located. His son was recognized 
as the new ruler. A Chinese commissioner was sent to sup-
port him during the first several years of his ruling (Reid, 
1996: 23). The young ruler visited China again in 1412.
??Gilpin (1981: 151) also notes, ‘[t]he Chinese Empire pur-
sued a deliberate policy of preventing the development of 
economic centers that might break off. Chinese cities were 
administrative centers responsive to the imperial center; they 
seldom became commercial centers.’
??The ‘age of commerce’ is the title of a two-volume study 
by Anthony Reid (1988, 1993). The study examines the 
transformation of Southeast Asia when the region experi-
enced a trade boom between 1450 and 1680. This period 
corresponds roughly to the mid- and late-Ming and the early 
Qing dynasties in China.
??For example, Ryukyu opened commercial relations with 
Palembang in 1428 and with Java in 1430. At the time, 
Palembang was forbidden to keep direct link with China 
(Reid, 1996: 30).
??Mongol troops were dispatched to Dai Viet in 1257, 1285 
and 1287, to Champa in 1281, to the Burmese-Mon Kingdom 
of Pagan in 1277 and 1287, and to Java in 1293 (Stuart-Fox, 
2003: Ch4). These military expeditions ended only in short-
term victories. By the end of the 13th century, Mongol troops 
were mostly pushed out of Southeast Asia.
??Between 1405 and 1433, the Ming court had seven times 
sent Zheng He and his grand fleets to Southeast Asia and 
beyond. Evidence shows that these voyages were not shy of 
displaying forces, but its scale was much smaller than the 
Ming’s invasion of Dai Viet around the same period (see 
Wade, 2005).
??The third Ming emperor, Yong-le, was himself a usurper. 
He was the fourth son of the first Ming emperor. When the 
emperor died in 1398, the throne passed on to his nephew, 
Jian-wen. In the following years, bitter distrust emerged 
between the young emperor and his uncle. In 1402 Yong-le 
marched his troops to the capital and claimed himself the 
new emperor.
??According to Fairbank (1968: 11), five Southeast Asian 
countries were officially recorded as the tributaries of the 
Qing court in 1818: Dai Viet, Laos, Siam, Sulu and Burma.
??Fairbank (1942: 145) notes, ‘I am not aware of political or 
other circumstances likely to have produced the recorded 
increase of activity. As far as it goes, this evidence lends 
strong support to the theory that tribute missions functioned 
chiefly as a vehicle for trade.’
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